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TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO
COURTROOM ADJUDICATION: THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND THIRD PARTY
DOCUMENT DISCOVERY
Sara Rosenberg*
Since the early twentieth century, arbitration has been increasingly
recognized by Congress and the courts as an efficient alternative to
courtroom adjudication. The circuit courts of appeals differ in their
interpretations of the third party discovery authority that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) grants to an arbitrator. The conflict among the
circuits reveals a tension between the courts’ desire to uphold individual
rights by treating arbitration agreements as private contracts and the
desire to maintain arbitration as an efficient alternative to litigation.
This Note surveys the unresolved circuit split and argues that, above all,
it is imperative that the rules governing arbitration set forth clear default
procedures for conducting discovery. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits assert that, in the interest of efficiency,
the FAA authorizes an arbitrator to fully realize the rights of the
contracting parties, including compelling prehearing document production
from a third party. In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second
and Third Circuits, focusing on the plain meaning of the statute’s language,
have held that an arbitrator may not compel a third party to produce
documents prior to the arbitral hearing. Examining the issue in the context
of the history and development of the FAA, this Note analyzes the
arguments set forth in each Circuit and ultimately advocates that an
arbitrator should be able to use his time most efficiently and with the aid of
all documents relevant to the dispute.
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INTRODUCTION
“Investors have their ups and downs in the market, but when it comes to
resolving disputes with Wall Street brokers, they seldom win . . . .”1
Arbitration is “[a] method of dispute resolution involving one or more
neutral third parties who are usu[ally] agreed to by the disputing parties and
whose decision is binding.”2 Since the early twentieth century, arbitration
has been increasingly recognized by courts and utilized in both private and
commercial settings as an alternative to time-consuming and costly
courtroom adjudication.3 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized a “strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration
agreements.”4 One motivation for this policy is arbitration’s potential to
reduce judicial congestion.5
1. Joseph A. Giannone, Wall Street Arbitration Stacked Against Investors: Study,
REUTERS
(June
7,
2007,
7:42
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN
0741372120070608.
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009).
3. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 4 (2000) (“The use of [Alternative Dispute Resolution] has . . . grown
dramatically in the private domain. The American Arbitration Association had 92,000
arbitration requests filed in 1998, an increase of 21% over those filed in 1994.”).
4. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985); see infra notes 50–53
and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The desire to avoid the delay and
expense of litigation persists. The desire grows with time and as delays and expenses
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One common use of arbitration is to resolve disputes between brokerage
firms and their clients. Often, however, consumers find themselves
disadvantaged when forced to arbitrate against their brokerage firms6
because such firms have the resources to “easily outmuscle and
Consumers are
outmaneuver their clients when conflicts arise.”7
particularly disadvantaged by the vagueness of rules governing discovery in
arbitration because it is the firms who hold the majority of the documents
relevant to the dispute. In response, recent legislation has sought to replace
mandatory arbitration clauses with a private right of action.8 In May 2007,
Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont and then-Senator Russell D. Feingold
of Wisconsin wrote to Christopher Cox, then-chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), citing a lack of a “court-supervised
discovery process” among other reasons investors should be permitted the
right to bring their claims to court.9 Since then, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has tried “to make the arbitration process
more investor-friendly.”10 These efforts were enhanced on July 21, 2010
when the U.S. Congress passed, and President Barack Obama signed, a
financial regulatory reform bill which, in part, authorized the SEC to
prohibit or limit investment and brokerage firms’ use of mandatory
arbitration clauses.11

increase.”); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“It is practically appropriate that the action [to
enact the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] should be taken at this time when there is so much
agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely
eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and
enforceable.”); John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Validity and Effect of Local District Court
Rules Providing for Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures as Pretrial Settlement
Mechanisms, 86 A.L.R. FED. 211, 212 (1988) (identifying “lessening docket congestion” as
one reason for the growing number of court-sponsored arbitration programs).
6. See, e.g., Giannone, supra note 1 (illustrating the relative disparity between
individual investors and brokerage houses in a review of 14,000 cases between 1995 and
2004 in which investors recovered about thirty-four percent of their claims); Peter J.
Henning, Examining a Move To Change Securities Litigation, DEALBOOK’S WHITE COLLAR
WATCH (Dec. 16, 2009, 9:18 AM) http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/
examining-a-move-to-change-securities-litigation; Bob Van Voris & Holly Rosenkrantz,
Arbitration Abuses “Deeply Disturbing,” Kucinich Says (Update2), BLOOMBERG (July 22,
2009,
5:07
PM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aeSRAtP1lRrE (quoting Vice President of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
Richard Naimark, stating: “A series of important fairness and due process concerns must be
addressed and resolved before [the AAA] will proceed with the administration of any future
debt collection arbitrations.”).
7. Gretchen Morgenson, Dear S.E.C., Reconsider Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2007, http://select.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/business/yourmoney/06gret.html.
8. See Henning, supra note 6; Morgenson, supra note 7.
9. Morgenson, supra note 7.
10. Henning, supra note 6 (describing the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s
(FINRA) attempts to make arbitration more “investor-friendly”).
11. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)) (stating that the SEC may “prohibit,
or impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or
clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute
between them . . . if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are
in the public interest and for the protection of investors”).
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This Note analyzes the split among the federal circuit courts of appeals in
their interpretation of the discovery provision of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), which supplies a body of substantive federal law governing
arbitration proceedings.12 Specifically, § 7 of the FAA provides, in
pertinent part: “[A]rbitrators . . . or a majority of them, may summon in
writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness in a
proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.”13 Courts differ as
to whether this language grants an arbitrator authority to compel prehearing
document production from an outside party.14 The courts differ primarily
in their interpretation of Congress’s goal in enacting the FAA. Some
courts, such as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits, have found that the provision authorizes prehearing subpoena
power in order to promote arbitration generally as an efficient alternative to
litigation.15 Other courts, such as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Third Circuits, emphasize the “plain meaning” of the statute’s
language in limiting arbitrators’ powers over third parties.16 Within this
interpretive split are still further divisions, each circuit having constructed
situations in which an arbitrator may or may not compel prehearing
document production.17 As a result of this circuit split, the outcomes of
similar disputes may differ dramatically depending on the jurisdiction in
which they are arbitrated.18 Further, disputes involving prehearing
discovery frequently end in costly litigation.19 This is problematic—due to
gross differences in access to evidence, those with greater negotiating
power may seek to gain an unfair advantage by artificially shifting the

12. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006) (commonly referred to as
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)).
13. Id. § 7.
14. See infra Part II.A–C.
15. See infra Part II.A–B.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. Compare COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999)
(contemplating an arbitrator’s authority to compel prehearing document production from a
third party only “upon a showing of special need or hardship”), with In re Sec. Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing for third party production of relevant
documents so long as the third party is “integrally related to the underlying arbitration, if not
an actual party”).
18. See, e.g., Sean T. Carnathan, Discovery in Arbitration? Well, it Depends . . ., 10
BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 24–25 (“Given the unsettled state of the law, you cannot
be confident of your right to enforce a . . . subpoena during the arbitration proceeding.”); J.S.
“Chris” Christie, Jr., Preparing for and Prevailing at an Arbitration Hearing, 32 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 265, 287–88 (2009) (suggesting the only “safe” solution to the potential for
different applications in different jurisdictions is to subpoena third party testimony at a
“mini-hearing”).
19. See infra Part II.A–C (presenting examples of disputes over arbitral procedure
requiring judicial resolution).

2010]

AN ALTERNATIVE TO COURTROOM ADJUDICATION

1337

jurisdiction governing the arbitration agreement.20 Parties may even choose
to forego arbitration altogether.21
This Note argues that courts must adopt more streamlined practices to
enforce individuals’ rights in arbitration. Rules setting clear default
standards for conducting discovery in arbitration are imperative to
maintaining the parties’ rights. This Note begins by analyzing the current
ambiguity regarding an arbitrator’s discovery authority over third parties.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the history, purposes, and
process of arbitration, as well as the enactment of the FAA. Part II
discusses the three distinct approaches taken by the federal circuit courts of
appeals and explains how the approaches differ. Part III suggests that,
although some may consider the approach taken by the Second and Third
Circuits to be the “emerging rule,”22 it is not necessarily the best rule
because it is in the public interest for an arbitrator to use his time most
efficiently and with the aid of all documents relevant to the dispute,
regardless of an outsider’s minor privacy interest.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS AND RELATED SUPREME
COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Part I of this Note provides background on the nature and purposes of
arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution. Part I.A defines
arbitration and discusses its governing federal statute, the FAA. Part I.B
outlines the process of arbitration, from the selection of the panel to the
conduct of the hearing.
A. Arbitration: What, Why, and How
1. History and Purpose
As mentioned in the Introduction, arbitration is “[a] method of dispute
resolution involving one or more neutral third parties . . . whose decision is
20. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938) (establishing a doctrine to
avoid the problem of forum shopping, in which parties might seek diversity jurisdiction
merely to have their claim adjudicated under more favorable federal law).
21. See, e.g., John H. Henn, Where Should You Litigate Your Business Dispute? In an
Arbitration? Or Through the Courts, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 34, 36 (2004) (noting that, though
arbitration has become increasingly popular since the 1990s, “if documents or other
information in the hands of a third party is likely to be critical to a resolution of a [businessto-business] dispute, then arbitration will be less attractive than courtroom litigation”);
Lowell Pearson, The Case For Non-party Discovery Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 59
DISP. RESOL. J. 46, 50 (2004) (illustrating the necessity of “discovery of non-parties . . . in
large, complex cases” such as those “confirm[ing] arbitration awards of $41 million and $27
million, with the hearings lasting up to 50 days” (citing Ronald Offenkrantz, Negotiating and
Drafting the Agreement to Arbitrate in 2003: Insuring Against a Failure of Professional
Responsibility, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 271, 271 (2003))); see also Charles L. Knapp,
Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761,
790 (2002) (suggesting the adoption of a broader discovery process as a potential
improvement to arbitration).
22. Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216
(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting THOMAS H. OEHMKE, 3 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 91:5 (2008)).
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binding.”23 Arbitration is considered an efficient alternative to litigation, in
part because its procedures are less formalized.24
With a written record dating back to about 2550 B.C.,25 arbitration
“survived the dark ages” and now underlies much of international dispute
resolution.26 However, in the eighteenth century, English courts began
viewing arbitration with suspicion, wary that extra-judicial dispute
resolution sought to “‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the courts.”27 This suspicion
continued as “American courts felt compelled to follow their English
counterparts.”28 In 1874, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “agreements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law” were
“illegal and void.”29 The FAA was enacted in part to reverse this attitude,
and a House Committee Report accompanying the FAA’s enactment in
1925 specifically highlighted judicial misgivings about arbitration.30 As
such, Supreme Court decisions subsequent to the FAA’s enactment have
facilitated arbitration’s current position as the “alternative dispute
settlement procedure of choice” in commercial disputes.31
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009).
24. See, e.g., Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Parties that opt
for arbitration trade the formalities of the judicial process for the expertise and expedition
associated with arbitration, a less formal process of dispute resolution by [one] who . . .
brings to the assignment knowledge of the commercial setting in which the dispute arose.”);
JOHN W. COOLEY WITH STEVEN LUBET, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY § 1.3, at 5, 7 (2d ed. 2003)
(counseling those who seek to represent a party to arbitration in the relative advantages of
the arbitral process, including an “enhanc[ement of] the potential for a more expeditious
resolution”).
25. 1 MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2:1 (3d ed. 2009)
(citing WILLIAM F. ALBRIGHT, FROM THE STONE AGE TO CHRISTIANITY: MONOTHEISM, AND
THE HISTORICAL PROCESS (Ditzion Press 2008) (1940); ANCIENT NEAR-EAST TEXTS
RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT (James B. Pritchard ed., 3d ed. 1969)).
26. Id. § 2:3.
27. Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir.
1942) (quoting Kill v. Hollister (1746) 1 Wils. 129 (Gr. Brit.)); accord 1 DOMKE, supra note
25, § 2:3.
28. 1 DOMKE, supra note 25, § 2:4.
29. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).
30. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“The need for the law arises from an
anachronism of our American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to
arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This
jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the
English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt
that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment,
although they have frequently criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the
injustice which results from it.”); S. REP. NO. 68-536, 2 (1924) (offering a similar
explanation for the need to eradicate judicial hesitancy towards arbitration); see also
Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 985 n.24A (citing Congress’s mandate, in 1860, that foreign service
officers encourage the use of arbitration to settle disputes as evidence that “Congress was not
in sympathy with judicial hostility to arbitration”).
31. 1 DOMKE, supra note 25, § 2:5; see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985) (“[W]e are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”);
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218–20 & 220 n.6 (1985) (finding that
“agreements to arbitrate must be enforced, absent a ground for revocation of the contractual
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Arbitration is not the only form of alternative dispute resolution. Other
forms include negotiation, conciliation, facilitation, appraisal, mediation,
and court-annexed hybrids.32 Arbitration is distinguishable from appraisal
in that “[a]n arbitration ‘ordinarily . . . dispos[es] of the entire controversy
between the parties, and judgment may be entered upon the award, whereas
an appraisal establishes only the amount of loss and not liability.’”33
Arbitration is similarly distinguishable from mediation in that a mediator’s
determination is not binding on the parties.34 In other words, “[m]ediation
is an advisory, arbitration a judicial, function. Mediation recommends,
arbitration decides.”35
Arbitration is primarily used to prevent much of the time and costs
associated with litigation.36 The Supreme Court has noted that, by
submitting to arbitrate a claim, a party “trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration.”37 Arbitration also serves to relieve the courts of
docket congestion.38
2. Governance
Arbitration is usually “‘a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.’”39 Disputes decided through arbitration are not subject entirely to
the whim of the arbitral panel, however—arbitration procedure is governed
by statutory law.40 The FAA is the federal statute providing default rules
agreement”); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974) (noting that the
FAA was “designed to allow parties to avoid ‘the costliness and delays of litigation,’ and to
place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other contracts’” (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 68-96, at 1, 2 (1924))).
32. See generally COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY, supra note 24, § 1.1 (discussing
the relative formality involved in various forms of dispute resolution). These other forms of
alternative dispute resolution are outside the scope of this Note.
33. Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 454 F.3d 1128, 1136 (10th
Cir. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Elberon Bathing Co. v. Ambassador Ins. Co.,
389 A.2d 439, 446 (N.J. 1978)).
34. 1 DOMKE, supra note 25, § 1:3.
35. Id. (quoting J.D. MOORE, 7 DIG. INT’L L. 25 (1906)).
36. See supra notes 5, 24 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
identified this as a positive aspect of arbitration. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 986
(2008) (“A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined
proceedings and expeditious results.’” (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633)); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278 (1995).
37. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Pest Mgmt., Inc. v. Langer, 250
S.W.3d 550, 556 (Ark. 2007) (“Arbitration is strongly favored . . . as a matter of public
policy and is looked upon with approval by courts as a less expensive and more expeditious
means of settling [disputes] and relieving docket congestion.”).
39. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 876 (1998) (quoting United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
40. See generally United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006). The FAA
does not preclude the parties from “structur[ing] their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989); accord Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)
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governing arbitration proceedings.41 This section presents a brief history of
the FAA, with a discussion of the circumstances surrounding its enactment
and insight into the FAA’s current standing in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925.42 Congressional reports reviewing
the Act detailed judicial distrust of arbitration throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.43 The Senate report named three concerns used to
perpetuate such distrust: first, the courts feared arbitration tribunals did not
have the “means to give full or proper redress” to wronged individuals;44
second, the courts feared ouster of their jurisdiction;45 and third, the courts
felt compelled to follow a long-established precedent of distrust, regardless
of whether it was rational in modern legal proceedings.46 The House report
stated: “The purpose of [the FAA] is to make valid and enforcible
agreements for arbitration . . . which may be the subject of litigation in the
Federal courts,”47 thus relieving the courts of the need to continue a policy
with great precedential value but little practical value.48 Moreover, the
reports noted that enforcing agreements to arbitrate would help all parties
avoid the “costliness and delays of litigation.”49
The Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence has generally focused on the
congressional intent to promote arbitration as an alternative to litigation.50
(“[T]he FAA’s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the
contracting parties.”); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145,
151 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (describing the parties as “the architects of their own
arbitration process”). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA, “[a]bsent
some ambiguity in the agreement . . . it is the language of the contract that defines the scope
of disputes subject to arbitration.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002).
41. Forty-nine states have also adopted, in some derivation, the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA) of 1955, as amended in 1956, or the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) of
2000. See 1 DOMKE, supra note 25, § 7:2. Similar to the FAA, the purpose of these model
codes is to “reduce the caseloads in the courts and to promote judicial economy.” 1 DOMKE,
supra note 25, § 7:2.
42. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307).
43. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see supra note 30
and accompanying text.
44. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1; accord S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 1.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2.
49. See id.; S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3.
50. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (noting that “the
FAA . . . ensures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc.
v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“There is no
federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy
is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate.”); accord Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). But see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216–17 (1985) (resolving a circuit split in concluding that the FAA,
“both through its plain meaning and the strong federal policy it reflects, requires courts to
enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate, and ‘not to substitute [its] own views of
economy and efficiency’ for those of Congress” (quoting Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc.,
661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1981))).
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In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,51
Justice William J. Brennan, writing for the majority, declared the FAA a
“congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”52 Since then, the Supreme Court has continually interpreted
the FAA as a policy-oriented statute, meant to “guarantee[] the enforcement
of private contractual arrangements” as well as to promote arbitration as an
alternative to litigation.53
B. Arbitration Procedure: Maintaining Parties’ Rights Without the
Formality of Litigation
The previous section noted that parties to arbitration forego the formality
of courtroom procedures in favor of the perceived efficiencies of
arbitration.54 This section discusses the procedures involved in the
selection of arbitrators, notice and discovery in arbitration, and the arbitral
hearing.
An “arbitrator” is “[a] neutral person who resolves disputes between
parties” that have an arbitration agreement.55 If the appointment or the
method for selecting the arbitrator or arbitrators is set forth in the arbitration
agreement, that appointment or method must be followed.56 In the absence
of a provision defining the method for selection—if one of the parties fails
to cooperate, if there is an unreasonable lapse in time, or where an
appointed arbitrator fails to act—the FAA provides that “upon the
application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators . . . who shall act under the said
agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been
specifically named therein.”57
While almost anyone who is not a party to the dispute may be appointed
as an arbitrator, the arbitrator is often expected to have some expertise in
the subject matter of the dispute.58 An arbitrator does, however, have an
51. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
52. Id. at 24.
53. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985).
54. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 120 (9th ed. 2009).
56. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
57. Id. The FAA further provides that “unless otherwise provided in the agreement the
arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.” Id. The RUAA contains a similar provision—it
does not explicitly state that there shall be a single arbitrator, though it may be implied
through its use of the singular form of “arbitrator.” See REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
§ 11(a) (2000).
58. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. No. 46 v. Del Bianco, 215 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)
(finding that the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act “contemplate[d] that arbitrators will be
men who understand the terminology, practices, customs and usages of the trade, business or
profession involved in the dispute—men, who can bring knowledge, expertise and
understanding to the solution of the controversy”); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 11, cmt. 1
(2000) (“Parties oftentimes choose an arbitrator because of that person’s knowledge or
experience . . . .”); COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY, supra note 24, § 2.6.3, at 41 (advising
potential arbitral advocates that “many arbitrators are chosen from different business fields
based on their professional experience”).
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affirmative duty to disclose any information relevant to his or her inability
to be fair or impartial.59 Similarly, an arbitrator’s authority is limited by the
arbitration agreement.60 The FAA explicitly provides for vacatur of the
arbitral award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”61
However, the Supreme Court has long provided broad deference to
arbitral panels in determining questions of law and fact.62 The Court has
similarly upheld a standard of deference with regard to arbitrators’
procedural determinations, noting that “[q]uestions concerning the
procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they
develop in the context of an actual dispute about the rights of the parties to
the contract or those covered by it.”63 The Court has interpreted § 10(a)(3) of
the FAA64 to provide for vacatur of a procedural determination only in the
case of “affirmative misconduct.”65 Further,
[e]ven in the very rare instances when an arbitrator’s procedural
aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court
must not foreclose further proceedings by settling the merits according to
its own judgment of the appropriate result, since this step would
improperly substitute a judicial determination for the arbitrator’s decision
that the parties bargained for in the . . . agreement.66

59. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (“[T]he United States court . . . may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration . . . where there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators . . . .”); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) (interpreting § 10 of the FAA as evidence of Congress’s
“desire . . . to provide not merely for any arbitration but for an impartial one”); JOHN W.
COOLEY, THE ARBITRATOR’S HANDBOOK § 1.3 (1st ed. 1998) (discussing arbitrator ethics).
60. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)
(noting that “the FAA’s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes
of the contracting parties”); Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1987)
(“‘[T]he scope of authority of arbitrators generally depends on the intention of the parties to
an arbitration, and is determined by the agreement . . . . Such an agreement . . . serves not
only to define, but to circumscribe, the authority of arbitrators.’” (quoting 6 C.J.S.
Arbitration § 69, at 280–81 (1975))); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Boata, 926 A.2d 1035,
1040 (Conn. 2007) (“‘[I]t is the province of the parties to set the limits of the authority of the
arbitrators . . . .’” (quoting Nussbaum v. Kimberly Timbers, Ltd., 856 A.2d 364, 369 (Conn.
2004))).
61. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
62. See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)
(“Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties’ agreement.”
(citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987))); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960) (“The function of the
court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract
interpretation to the arbitrator.”).
63. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556–57 (1964).
64. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (“[T]he United States court . . . may make an order vacating the
award . . . where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy . . . .”).
65. United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 40.
66. Id. at 41 n.10; see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 15(a) (2000) (“An arbitrator may
conduct an arbitration in such manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and
expeditious disposition of the proceeding.”).
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Arbitration proceedings differ from those of traditional courtroom
adjudication in two ways. First, arbitration proceedings are generally far
less formal.67 Second, in arbitration “lawyers are merely helping the
arbitrator to create a complete record upon which to reach an unbiased and
knowledgeable decision” rather than seeking to prolong discovery for
strategic reasons.68
It is generally advised in cases dealing with complex issues that the
parties hold a prehearing conference with the arbitrators, either in person or
by telephone.69 It is at this conference that the parties may clarify their
expectations and present to the arbitrator any discovery-related
disagreements.70 Absent an agreement to the contrary, most federal courts
interpret § 7 of the FAA71 to allow arbitrators to determine the proper
conduct of discovery.72
Arbitrators are given broad discretion in the conduct and proceedings of
the hearing.73 After a hearing in front of the appointed arbitrators whereby
evidence is introduced and representatives for both sides present their cases,
the arbitrators decide the dispute.74 Generally, “[t]he arbitrator may grant
any just and equitable relief within the scope of her authority.”75
II. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS: DOES § 7 AUTHORIZE AN
ARBITRATOR TO COMPEL PREHEARING DOCUMENT PRODUCTION FROM A
THIRD PARTY?
Part I outlined the history, purpose, and process of arbitration under the
FAA. Part II examines the current split in authority over whether an
arbitrator can compel prehearing document production from a third party.

67. See COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY, supra note 24, § 1.1, at 3.
68. 1 DOMKE, supra note 25, § 28:2.
69. See COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY, supra note 24, § 3.5, at 63.
70. See id.
71. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Hires Parts Serv., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 859 F. Supp. 349, 353 (N.D. Ind.
1994) (making discovery available in arbitration proceedings); Stanton v. Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (authorizing arbitrators to
order and conduct any discovery they find necessary); Miss. Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,
69 F.R.D. 558, 567 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (giving arbitrator discretion to permit and supervise
discovery).
73. See Evans v. Centerstone Dev. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 749 (Ct. App. 2005)
(“Public policy supports minimal judicial participation in arbitration proceedings. Courts do
not review arbitration awards for factual or legal errors.” (citing Moncharsh v. Heily &
Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 903 (Cal. 1992); Jones v. Humanscale Corp., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 881,
886–87 (Ct. App. 2005))).
74. See generally AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648–49
(1986) (“[A]rbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have
agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.” (citing Gateway Coal Co. v.
Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974))); City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S.
180, 194 (1910) (“An arbitration implies a difference, a dispute, and involves ordinarily a
hearing and all thereby implied.”).
75. See COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY, supra note 24, ch. 5, § 6.2, at 208 (noting
also that “[t]he parties may, however, limit the scope of the allowable remedies or relief
available to the arbitrator, and by agreement may exclude specific remedies”).
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These disparate outcomes have turned largely on conflicting views
regarding which legislative objective properly controls the FAA.76
Part II.A introduces the Sixth and Eighth Circuit’s view, which
emphasized Congress’s goal of furthering more “efficient” procedures in
arbitral discovery.77 Part II.B discusses the rationale underlying the Fourth
Circuit’s approach, which provides that a third party may be compelled to
produce documents in certain special circumstances.78 Part II.C tracks the
Second and Third Circuits, which restricts arbitrators’ subpoena authority to
only that which § 7 expressly grants.79
A. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits: Recognizing an Arbitrator’s Implicit
Power Through a Broad Construction of § 7
In American Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV (New
World Communications of Detroit, Inc.),80 the Sixth Circuit held that the
Labor Management Relations Act authorized an arbitrator to compel a third
party to produce documents he deemed material.81 The court emphasized
the necessity of judicial deference to arbitrators’ decisions, stating that
federal courts may not second-guess an arbitrator’s determination as to the
relevance of requested documents.82 In In re Security Life Insurance Co. of
America,83 the Eighth Circuit focused on a reinsurer’s connection to “the
root of the dispute” in finding third party prehearing document production
to be an appropriate exercise of an arbitrator’s implicit authority.84 This
part outlines each court’s analysis.
1. Sixth Circuit
This section explains the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in American
Federation. In that case, WJBK-TV, a Michigan-based television station,
terminated Warren Pierce, a news anchor whose employment contract
contained a mandatory arbitration clause.85 WJBK-TV alleged that Pierce
violated his contract and the code of business conduct when he misused
certain vehicles that the station had provided to him as a media
personality.86 Pierce subsequently initiated a grievance proceeding,
76. See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text. Compare Am. Fed’n of Television &
Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV (New World Commc’ns of Detroit, Inc.), 164 F.3d 1004, 1009
(6th Cir. 1999) (relying on the potentially efficient result of giving subpoena authority to
arbitrators), with Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d Cir.
2004) (finding “unambiguous[] restrict[ion]” of an arbitrator’s subpoena authority in the
plain meaning of § 7).
77. See infra Part II.A.
78. See infra Part II.B.
79. See infra Part II.C.
80. 164 F.3d 1004 (6th Cir. 1999).
81. See id. at 1008–10.
82. See id. at 1010.
83. 228 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2000).
84. Id. at 871.
85. See Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1006. The clause contemplated an arbitration conducted
pursuant to the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the AAA. See id. at 1006 n.2.
86. Id. at 1006.
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claiming that other media personalities had not been discharged for similar
actions.87 The arbitrator, at Pierce’s request, subpoenaed a third party,
A&M Specialists, Inc. (A&M),88 to appear at the office of Pierce’s counsel
and produce documents relating to other media personalities’ use of
company-provided vehicles.89 In response, A&M, which was not involved
in the original employment contract, moved the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan to quash the subpoena.90 The district court
ultimately dismissed the action because the information Pierce sought
through the subpoena would be irrelevant to the arbitrator’s ultimate
decision.91 The court explained that the information sought would only
show that other WJBK employees were similarly misusing vehicles, not, as
would be necessary to have any probative value, that WJBK was aware of
such behavior.92
After establishing that the district court had proper subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim, the Sixth Circuit considered the district court’s
authority to enforce the arbitrator’s subpoena.93 The court found that,
because the underlying dispute involved a collective bargaining agreement,
the case arose under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which
provided that the district court could properly enforce an arbitrator’s
subpoena of a third party.94 The court noted that federal courts may also
look to the FAA for “guidance” to determine an arbitrator’s subpoena
authority.95 Extrapolating from the FAA’s express authorization to
arbitrators to compel document production from a third party at the hearing,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the FAA “implicitly include[s] the
authority to compel the production of documents for inspection by a party
prior to the hearing.”96 In support, the court cited a number of district court
87. See id.
88. A&M Specialists, Inc. (A&M) supplied vehicles to media personalities on behalf of
various automobile manufacturers. Id.
89. See id. The subpoena also directed A&M to appear at a hearing scheduled to occur
the next week. Id.
90. See id. at 1006–07.
91. Id. at 1007.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 1007–10.
94. Id. at 1008.
95. Id. at 1009 (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40
n.9 (1987)). Though the FAA does not apply to “contracts of employment of . . . workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), the Supreme Court has held
that the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006),
contemplates that federal courts will consider the FAA for guidance where the Labor
Management Relations Act lacks express statutory direction. See United Paperworkers, 484
U.S. at 40 n.9 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957)). In
United Paperworkers, the Court acknowledged that labor arbitrators often limit “their
considerations to the facts known to the employer at the time of the discharge.” Id. at 40 n.8
(citing OWEN FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 303–06 (2d
ed. 1983); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 634–35 (3d
ed. 1973)). The Sixth Circuit refrained from deciding whether the FAA actually applied to
the arbitration at hand, instead allowing the FAA’s underlying federal policies to inform its
decision. See Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1009.
96. Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1009.
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cases extrapolating from the FAA’s authorization to compel document
production from a third party at the hearing that the FAA impliedly
authorizes the same authority prior to the hearing.97
However, this authority is not unlimited. The court limited the
arbitrator’s authority to documents that the arbitrator deemed relevant.98 As
to whether the requested documents were material to the underlying dispute
in that case, the Sixth Circuit found error in the district court’s refusal to
enforce the subpoena.99 The court emphasized that “‘a court’s power to
disturb such discretionary determinations is quite limited.’”100 This was so
even though the court found no evidence that the arbitrator had actually
considered the requested documents’ relevance to whether Pierce’s use of
the vehicles in fact violated the code of business conduct or to whether
others in similar positions were or were not similarly penalized.101 As a
result, the Sixth Circuit ordered the district court to compel production of
all documents for the arbitrator’s inspection.102
Judge Eric L. Clay dissented from the majority’s finding of federal
subject matter jurisdiction.103 Judge Clay agreed that federal courts have
authority to enforce arbitration agreements pursuant to § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, but he argued that the majority incorrectly
extended that authority to the enforcement of subpoenas against a third
party.104 The dissent distinguished the district court cases that the majority
97. See id. (citing Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 44–45
(M.D. Tenn. 1994) (deferring to an arbitration panel’s determination of relevance and
finding the panel’s decision to subpoena documents prior to the hearing reasonable “as a
method of dealing with complex and voluminous discovery matters in an orderly and
efficient manner”); Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241,
1242–43 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding that “arbitrators may order and conduct . . . discovery as
they find necessary,” not limited to appearances at hearing); Wilkes-Barre Publ’g Co. v.
Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 559 F. Supp. 875, 880 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (“[A]
decision to enforce an arbitrator’s subpoena will promote the goals of labor policy if it will
foster the effective operation of arbitration machinery.”)).
98. See Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1009. The court specifically circumvented the question
of whether an arbitrator is authorized to subpoena a third party to a prehearing deposition,
deciding only that arbitrators could subpoena relevant prehearing document production. Id.
at 1009 & n.7.
99. See id. at 1010 (noting that “the relevance of the information and the appropriateness
of the subpoena should be determined in the first instance by the arbitrator”).
100. Id. (quoting Nat’l Post Office Mailhandlers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 841
(6th Cir. 1985)); see also United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 36 (discussing the courts’
“limited role” in reviewing the substantive decisions of arbitrators). For a more detailed
discussion of judicial deference to arbitral decision-making, see supra notes 62–66 and
accompanying text.
101. See Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1010. The court stated that “‘[i]t must be assumed that
the presiding arbitrator is an experienced person well versed in evaluating’ . . . the objections
of A&M, and is capable of screening the material for what is relevant and ordering proper
safeguards for the information.” Id. (quoting Local Lodge 1746, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v.
Pratt & Whitney Div. of United Aircraft Corp., 329 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D. Conn. 1971)).
102. See id. Because the record indicated that A&M had not raised its objections directly
to the arbitrator, the Sixth Circuit ordered A&M to immediately provide the requested
documents (and any objections) for a proper determination of relevance. Id.
103. See id. at 1011–13 (Clay, J., dissenting).
104. Id. But see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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relied upon, noting that those allowing an arbitrator to enforce document
subpoenas did so in the context of subpoenas directed at parties only, and
those finding federal court authority to enforce a subpoena directed at a
third party did so under the aegis of the FAA, not the Labor Management
Relations Act.105 Nevertheless, Judge Clay found that “the FAA [would]
mandate[] enforcement of the subpoena at issue” had the action been raised
in state court due to the deference owed to an arbitrator’s judgment.106
2. Eighth Circuit
This section discusses the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in In re Security
Life Insurance Co. of America.107 To underwrite its new group health
insurance product, Security Life Insurance Company (Security) entered into
a reinsurance contract to be managed by Duncanson & Holt, Inc. (D&H).108
The contract contemplated that the reinsurers, Transamerica Occidental Life
Insurance Company (Transamerica) among them, would assume eighty-five
percent of the risk and eighty-five percent of the liability for all loss
adjustment expenses (including “extra-contractual” fees associated with
legal actions or negligence claims) in exchange for eighty-five percent of
the premiums.109 However, after Security lost a series of state court
actions,110 D&H and Transamerica refused to cover its liabilities, claiming
that Security had not completed the “counsel and concur” part of the
contract.111 Security initiated an arbitration proceeding to settle the
dispute.112 Transamerica refused to recognize itself as a party to the
105. See Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1010 n.1. See also Laufman v. Anpol Contracting Inc.,
94 Civ. 5362 (CSH), 1995 WL 360015, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1995) (enforcing subpoena
against third party under FAA); Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 45
(M.D. Tenn. 1994) (same); Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp.
1241, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same); Wilkes-Barre Publ’g Co. v. Newspaper Guild of
Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 559 F. Supp. 875, 882 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (enforcing subpoena
against party to the arbitration); Local Lodge 1746, 329 F. Supp. at 283–84 (enforcing
subpoena against party to the arbitration); supra note 97 and accompanying text.
106. See Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1014–15 (citing Nat’l Post Office Mailhandlers v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[A] court’s power to disturb such
discretionary determinations [of arbitrators] is quite limited.”)). The Eighth Circuit similarly
rejected the argument that § 7 of the FAA authorizes district court review of the propriety of
an arbitral panel’s subpoena, finding such review to be “antithetical to the well-recognized
federal policy favoring arbitration, and compromises the panel’s presumed expertise in the
matter at hand.” In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2000).
107. 228 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2000).
108. Id. at 867.
109. Id. The assumption of liability also required Security Life Insurance Company
(Security) to “counsel[] with and obtain[] the concurrence of [Duncanson & Holt, Inc.
(D&H)] ‘with respect to the actions giving rise to the extra contractual obligation.’” Id.
(citations omitted).
110. See, e.g., Clark v. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 509 S.E.2d 602, 603 (Ga. 1998)
(entering a $14 million judgment against Security for liabilities relating to Georgia’s
Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act). Security was similarly implicated in four
other cases which D&H and the other reinsurers refused to cover. See In re Sec. Life Ins. Co.,
228 F.3d at 867.
111. In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at 867.
112. Id. at 868.
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arbitration for two reasons: first, the reinsurer argued that the “counsel-andconcur” clause was not an arbitrable issue; second, even if arbitrable, it
would not arbitrate the issue with D&H, but rather would arbitrate it
alone.113 Seeking testimony from a Transamerica employee114 as well as
document discovery, “Security petitioned the [arbitral] panel for a
subpoena.”115 Transamerica refused to comply with the subpoena, further
contesting its position as a party to the arbitration.116 Security then
petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota to compel
Transamerica’s compliance, which referred the case to a magistrate
judge.117 Rejecting Transamerica’s argument that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45(b)(2) limited the court’s ability to enforce the arbitral panel’s
subpoena to a 100-mile radius from the court’s situs,118 the magistrate judge
concluded that the “federal policy in favor of arbitration” supported
enforcement of an arbitrator’s full subpoena power.119 The magistrate
determined that Security’s attorney could properly issue the subpoena on
behalf of the court “as an officer of the court.”120 On review, the district
court affirmed the magistrate’s order, finding it “neither clearly erroneous
nor contrary to law.”121 Security, pursuant to the magistrate judge’s order,
served a subpoena on Transamerica and moved the California district court
to hold Transamerica in contempt upon refusal to comply with the new
Transamerica then complied, and an employee was
subpoena.122
deposed.123
Transamerica appealed to the Eighth Circuit arguing, in part, that because
Security had not demonstrated the “materiality of the information [] sought”
in its subpoena, the district court had improperly compelled Transamerica
113. Id.
114. Security sought testimony from a Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company
(Transamerica) employee regarding a meeting, unknown to Security at the time it was
embroiled in litigation, in which the reinsurers instructed D&H to deny coverage to Security
for its liability stemming from the Clark litigation. See id. at 868.
115. See In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at 868.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b)(2) states, in pertinent part, “[A] subpoena may
be served at any place . . . outside that district [in which the issuing court sits] but within 100
miles of the place specified for the deposition [or] hearing.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2)(B).
Transamerica claimed the arbitral panel’s subpoena was improperly served because
Transamerica’s Los Angeles office was more than 100 miles away from the Minnesota
federal court in which the arbitration was to proceed. See In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at
869.
119. In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at 869.
120. See id. (citing Amgen Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Del. Cnty., Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 883
(N.D. Ill. 1995)) (finding, due to the FAA’s language likening service of an arbitral
subpoena to one calling a witness to court, that a federal court could not enforce a subpoena
issued by an arbitrator, though it could enforce a subpoena issued by a party’s attorney under
Rule 45(a)(3)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Rule 45(a)(3)(B) states, in
pertinent part: “An attorney also may issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of . . . a court
for a district where a deposition is to be taken or production is to be made, if the attorney is
authorized to practice in the court where the action is pending.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3)(B).
121. In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at 869.
122. See id. at 869 n.2.
123. See id.
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to comply.124 Security responded, in part, that the district court was correct
in compelling compliance because Transamerica was a party to the
“underlying arbitration.”125 Alternatively, Security argued that, “even if
Transamerica [were] not a party to the underlying arbitration,” an arbitrator
has the authority to compel prehearing discovery, the relevance of which “is
a matter entrusted to the arbitration panel.”126
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s enforcement of the
subpoena.127 The court initially considered whether it was even capable of
providing relief, given that Transamerica had already complied with the
subpoena.128 As recognized by the Supreme Court in Church of
Scientology v. United States,129 the “partial-relief doctrine” allows a court
to render an opinion so long as “there is some means by which [it can]
effectuate a partial remedy.”130 The Eighth Circuit therefore found that,
though the deposition issue was rendered moot when the Transamerica
employee was deposed,131 Transamerica still had “sufficient interest in
maintaining the secrecy of the documents in question that it [would be]
possible for [the instant] appeal to lead to meaningful relief in the form of
the return of those documents or copies thereof.”132
Turning to the merits of the case, the Eighth Circuit found that, in the
interest of efficient dispute resolution, the FAA implicitly authorized an
arbitral panel to compel production of relevant documents for prehearing
review.133 The court deemed Transamerica’s status as a party to the
arbitration irrelevant, as it was “a party to the contract that [was] the root of
the dispute, and [was] therefore integrally related to the underlying
arbitration.”134 Finally, the court refused to “saddle” district courts with the
124. Id. at 869.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 872.
128. Id. at 869–70. The court did so because “[f]ederal courts are not empowered ‘to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’” Id. at 870 (quoting Church
of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)).
129. 506 U.S. at 9.
130. In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at 870 (citing Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at
13).
131. Id. (citing John Roe, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1416, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998);
Office of Thrift Supervision v. Dobbs, 931 F.2d 956, 957–59 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 870–71 (“Although the efficient resolution of disputes through arbitration
necessarily entails a limited discovery process, we believe this interest in efficiency is
furthered by permitting a party to review and digest relevant documentary evidence prior to
the arbitration hearing.”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has similarly
interpreted arbitral power broadly, stating: “Stricter rules cabin the generalist [judge]
because he is more apt to be led astray . . . . When disputants repose their trust in a specific
individual rather than . . . tak[ing] the luck of the draw, . . . they should have to take the bad
with the good unless” the arbitrator acts contrary to the law. Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d
773, 780 (7th Cir. 2005).
134. In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at 871. This conclusion limited the arbitral panel’s
prehearing authority to those essential third parties, leaving the possibility that a third party
not “integrally related to the underlying arbitration” may not be required to produce
documents for prehearing review by the parties. Like the Sixth Circuit in American
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“burden” of independently determining whether the subpoenaed documents
contained material information, noting that it would be “antithetical to the
well-recognized federal policy favoring arbitration, and [would]
compromise[] the panel’s presumed expertise in the matter at hand.”135
B. The Fourth Circuit: The Special Need Exception
In COMSAT Corp. v. National Science Foundation,136 the Fourth Circuit
left open the prospect that a party to arbitration may, “under unusual
circumstances, petition the district court to compel pre-arbitration discovery
upon a showing of special need or hardship.”137
In 1988, the National Science Foundation (NSF), an independent agency
created by Congress in 1950 “to initiate and support basic scientific
research,”138 entered into an agreement with Associated Universities, Inc.
(AUI), a non-profit organization specializing in “scientific research and
education.”139 The agreement provided that AUI would operate the
National Radio Astronomy Observatory, the operations of which the NSF
would fund, subject to congressional appropriations.140 AUI also entered
into a contract, containing a mandatory arbitration clause, with COMSAT
Corp. (then Radiation Systems, Inc.) to build an advanced radio telescope
for $55 million.141 Seven years into the contract, COMSAT claimed
entitlement to $29 million in additional costs.142 The parties consequently
began arbitration proceedings.143
Following an unsuccessful Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request,
COMSAT moved the arbitrator to issue subpoenas to both the NSF’s
“Document Custodian” to produce all documents related to the telescope
and to two NSF employees to appear and produce all relevant documents in
their possession.144 The NSF refused, citing both federal agency subpoena

Federation, the Eighth Circuit cited Meadows Indemnity Co. v. Nutmeg Insurance Co. in
support of its holding. Id. (citing Meadows Indem. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 45 (M.D. Tenn.
1994)) (focusing on a third party’s “intricate[] relat[ion] to the parties involved in the
arbitration” as opposed to “mere third-parties who have been pulled into [the] matter
arbitrarily” in finding arbitral subpoena authority); see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d at 871.
136. 190 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 276 (upholding Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1980)). This was
arguably dicta, given that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found no such
showing in the case at hand. Id. The court’s analysis in this case is nevertheless a significant
addition to the debate over an arbitrator’s third party subpoena power.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1) (2006); see also National Science Foundation,
http://www.nsf.gov/about (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
139. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 271.
140. See id. at 271–72.
141. See id. at 272 & n.2.
142. See id. at 272. COMSAT claimed that AUI requested changes in its telescope
specifications amounting to $29 million more than the parties initially anticipated. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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regulations and COMSAT’s current outstanding balance on the
photocopying fees associated with its FOIA request.145
In describing its considerations in deciding not to comply with the
subpoenas, the NSF implicated its federal agency “housekeeping”
regulations as established by the Supreme Court in Touhy v. Ragen.146
These considerations included: (1) whether compliance would “serve the
stated purposes of the regulation” (which include promoting efficiency,
avoiding controversy, maintaining impartiality, and protecting sensitive
information); (2) whether compliance “is necessary to prevent a miscarriage
of justice”; (3) “[w]hether NSF has an interest in the decision that will be
rendered”; and (4) whether compliance “is in the best interests of NSF and
the United States.”147 The NSF’s General Counsel concluded that
COMSAT could access many of the requested documents through its FOIA
request or from AUI, and, therefore, it was unnecessary for the NSF to
comply with the document subpoena; the agency did not make a
determination as to whether to honor the deposition subpoenas.148
In support of its motion to compel compliance, COMSAT argued before
a magistrate judge that its naming of the NSF in the motion’s caption had
effectively made the NSF a “party to the underlying dispute” and subject to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.149 The magistrate judge agreed,
ordering the NSF to comply with the subpoenas.150 The NSF appealed to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, arguing, inter
alia, that arbitrators are not authorized to subpoena third parties for
prehearing discovery.151 The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s
145. See id. Specifically, the National Science Foundation (NSF) stated that there were
40 feet of files containing responsive documents, totaling more than $20,000 in processing
fees. See id. at 272 n.4.
146. 340 U.S. 462 (1951); see also COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 272, 272 n.3. In Touhy, the
Supreme Court held that, consistent with 5 U.S.C. § 22 (now 5 U.S.C. § 301), it was within
the province of agency discretion to refuse compliance with certain subpoenas, considering
the complexity, sensitivity, and sheer amount of information potentially contained in
government agency files. 340 U.S. at 468. These regulations are often referred to as
“housekeeping” regulations. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 272 n.3.
The head of an Executive department . . . may prescribe regulations for the
government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and
performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records,
papers, or property. This section does not authorize withholding information from
the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.
5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). Upon application for a motion to compel, the magistrate judge ruled
that the NSF had been properly made a party to the underlying dispute by virtue of its being
named in the caption of COMSAT’s motion to compel. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 273. The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia affirmed, finding the FAA provided
“a broad grant of full subpoena power to arbitrators.” Id. at 274.
147. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 273; see also 45 C.F.R. § 615.5(b) (2009) (granting the
NSF General Counsel discretion over whether to permit NSF employees to testify or produce
documents upon consideration of the four factors listed in the text).
148. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 273. The NSF’s General Counsel also noted that the NSF had
not agreed to indemnify AUI, “so production would not further the goal of maintaining
NSF’s neutrality as a third party.” Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 273–74.
151. Id. at 274.
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order, finding that the NSF violated its Touhy regulations by failing to seek
judicial relief prior to the subpoenas’ return date and had thus waived its
right to object to them.152
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the NSF’s decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act’s153 deferential standard of review.154 The
court disagreed with the magistrate judge’s ruling that the NSF was
properly made a party to the underlying dispute.155 Rather, the court
decided that the NSF was not a party to the original contract, not
accountable for any applicable arbitral awards, and thus not a “party-ininterest in the arbitration proceeding.”156
In its discussion, the Fourth Circuit first analyzed the language of the
FAA, noting that the “subpoena powers of an arbitrator are limited to those
created by the express provisions” of the Act.157 The court held that the
language of § 7 authorized an arbitral panel to compel third party testimony
and discovery only at the arbitration hearing, not before.158 In so doing, the
court rejected COMSAT’s argument that the FAA’s enforcement
provision,159 authorizing a federal district court to enforce an arbitral
subpoena, also expanded the arbitrator’s subpoena authority to be on par
with that of a federal court.160 Instead, the court found that the provision
“simply [reiterated the arbitrator’s] power to compel non-parties to appear
before the arbitration tribunal.”161 The court further found that the NSF had
not waived its right to object to the subpoenas as the FAA requires no such
affirmative action.162 According to the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation, only

152. Id.
153. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
154. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of final agency
actions in cases where relief other than monetary damages is sought. See 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006). The Act allows the reviewing court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld”
or set aside agency decisions in certain specified situations. Id. § 706.
155. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 274–75; supra note 146 and accompanying text.
156. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 275. Associated Universities, Inc.’s (AUI) board of
trustees meeting minutes stated that “while litigation and award expenses are an ‘allowable
cost’ under the cooperative agreement, NSF’s obligation to secure funding for these costs ‘is
subject to the requirement that the Director [of the NSF], in his or her sole discretion, shall
determine the appropriateness of the reimbursement.’” Id. at 275 n.7 (citations omitted).
157. See id. at 275.
158. See id. (“By its own terms, the FAA’s subpoena authority is defined as the power of
the arbitration panel to compel non-parties to appear ‘before them;’ that is, to compel
testimony by non-parties at the arbitration hearing.” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 7 )).
159. The FAA’s enforcement provision states that a federal court “may compel the
attendance of [a subpoenaed person] before said arbitrator.” 9 U.S.C. § 7.
160. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 275.
161. Id. at 276.
162. See id. at 276 n.8. In response to the district court’s determination that the NSF had
waived its right to challenge the subpoenas, the Fourth Circuit noted that a federal agency’s
Touhy regulations are meant to “protect its employees from contempt proceedings” and “has
no bearing on the agency’s right to object to the arbitrator’s subpoena.” Id. (citing Smith v.
Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 880 (4th Cir. 1998); 45 C.F.R. § 615.1(d) (2009) (regulations “‘may
not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
by a party against the United States’”)).
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the party attempting to enforce the subpoena is required to affirmatively
petition the federal court to compel compliance.163
The court founded its analysis on its understanding of arbitral parties’
interests in preserving time and cost in resolving their disputes. In entering
an arbitration agreement, parties necessarily sacrifice certain procedural
rights.164 “A hallmark of arbitration—and a necessary precursor to its
efficient operation—is a limited discovery process” because parties entering
into an arbitration agreement reasonably expect to “‘relinquish the right to
certain procedural niceties which are normally associated with a formal
trial,’” including “full-blown discovery from the other or from third
parties.”165
Nevertheless, in the second step of its analysis, the court determined that
“the much-lauded efficiency of arbitration [would] be degraded if the
parties [were] unable to review and digest relevant evidence prior to the
arbitration hearing.”166 The court relied on Burton v. Bush167 and
maintained the possibility that a party, “under unusual circumstances,”
might petition a federal district court to compel discovery from a third party
prior to an arbitral hearing “upon a showing of special need or hardship.”168
The court declined to define “special need” except that, “at a minimum, a
party must demonstrate that the information it seeks is otherwise
unavailable.”169
The Fourth Circuit concluded that COMSAT would be unable to make
such a showing for two reasons: (1) COMSAT had failed to demonstrate
that it could not obtain many of the relevant documents through AUI, a
party to the arbitration; and (2) COMSAT had already obtained a plethora
of responsive documents from the NSF through its FOIA request.170 Even
if COMSAT could demonstrate special need, the Fourth Circuit decided
163. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 276.
164. Id. (“Parties to a private arbitration agreement forego certain procedural rights
attendant to formal litigation in return for a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of
their disputes.” (citing Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1980))).
165. Id. (quoting Burton, 614 F.2d at 390).
166. Id.
167. 614 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1980). In Burton, the Fourth Circuit first recognized an
arbitrator’s authority to compel discovery “upon a showing of special need.” Id. at 390.
168. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 276 (citing Burton, 614 F.2d at 391).
169. Id. In In re Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione S.p.A. v. M/V Allegra, the Fourth
Circuit returned to the “special need” exception, finding it applicable where a party sought
“time-sensitive” documents and was in danger of losing access to the documents, based on
the “evanescent nature of the evidence sought.” 198 F.3d 473, 480 (4th Cir. 1999). A
similarly muddled line of cases interpreted the “substantial need” language in Rule 26(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Carnathan, supra note 18, at 24. Rule 26(b)(3)
permits discovery of trial preparation materials upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery “has substantial need of the materials [and is unable] without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
An interpretation of substantial need under Rule 26(b)(3) has considered the “nature of the
documents (i.e., their relevance and importance)” and “the ability to obtain the facts . . . from
other sources.” Suggs v. Whitaker, 152 F.R.D. 501, 507 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (citing Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992)); see
Carnathan, supra note 18, at 24.
170. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 276–77.
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that a court could not reverse the NSF’s decision on review, regardless of
that court’s interpretation of the FAA, unless that decision had no rational
basis.171 This was because the agency’s decisions fell within the protection
of sovereign immunity, which the Administrative Procedure Act only
waives in cases where the non-party agency has acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.172 Because the NSF acted reasonably when it considered the
costs, benefits, and public interests involved in compliance with the
subpoenas, the Fourth Circuit was required to defer to the agency’s
judgment.173 Holding otherwise, according to the court’s analysis, would
potentially submit the NSF to a floodgate of requests for documents and
testimony, an unacceptably massive prospective burden.174 The court also
noted that such deference was required to maintain the proper balance
between the legislative and judicial branches of government, stating that
“‘federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do . . . [because o]ur
Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.’”175
C. The Second and Third Circuits: Interpreting § 7 Narrowly To Restrict
Arbitral Authority
This section analyzes the Second and Third Circuit’s rejection of an
arbitrator’s authority to compel prehearing document production from a
third party. In Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp.,176 the Third
Circuit held that the language of § 7 “unambiguously restricts an
arbitrator’s subpoena power to situations in which the non-party has been
called to appear in the physical presence of the arbitrator and to hand over
the documents at that time.”177 In Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102
at Lloyd’s of London,178 the Second Circuit followed the Third Circuit
holding in Hay Group.179 The Second Circuit acknowledged concerns
171. See id. at 277 (reviewing the NSF’s decision for evidence of “arbitrary and
capricious agency action”). The court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit in holding that
“non-party federal agencies must produce evidence in response to the subpoenas of private
litigants, subject only to the court’s discretionary right to limit burdensome discovery” under
Rules 26 and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 778–79 (9th Cir. 1994)).
172. Id. (citing Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1989)).
173. Id. at 277–78.
174. See id. at 278 (“Compliance with the third-party subpoenas issued in this single case,
where the litigant sought a tremendous number of agency documents and demanded the
presence of agency employees at depositions, would measurably strain agency resources and
divert NSF personnel from their official duties. Multiply the cost of compliance by the
number of NSF grantees—almost twenty thousand—who might become embroiled in similar
disputes, or by the limitless number of private litigants who might seek to draw upon NSF’s
expertise, and the potential cumulative burden upon the agency becomes alarmingly large.”).
175. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 866 (1984)).
176. 360 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2004).
177. Id. at 407.
178. 549 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2008).
179. Id. at 217–18. The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
came after having twice declined to answer the question. See id. at 212 n.2; see also Stolt-
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regarding “timeliness and efficiency,” but ultimately determined that, had
Congress wished to grant arbitrators the authority to compel prehearing
document production of non-parties, it would have written the statute to
include such power more clearly.180 The court further rejected the idea that
the language of § 7 carried any implication of an exception for “closely
related entities.”181
1. Third Circuit
Hay Group, Inc. (Hay), a management consulting firm, initiated an
arbitration proceeding against David A. Hoffrichter, a former employee, for
his violation of a non-solicitation clause in his employment separation
agreement.182 The agreement contained a provision forbidding Hoffrichter
from “soliciting any of Hay’s employees or clients for one year” following
separation and a mandatory arbitration clause.183 Hay sought document
production from PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. (PwC) and E.B.S.
Acquisition Corp. (E.B.S.), third parties to the arbitration proceeding, for
review prior to the hearing.184 Both PwC and E.B.S. refused to comply
with the subpoena.185 Hay petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, which enforced the subpoena over PwC’s and
E.B.S’s contention that the FAA did not authorize prehearing document
production from third parties.186 The court noted that the subpoenas were
valid and enforceable, even under the Fourth Circuit’s “special need”
requirement.187 The district court also rejected PwC’s and E.B.S.’s
argument that the territorial limitations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Nielsen SA v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We decline to decide
whether Section 7 [of the FAA] authorizes arbitrators to issue subpoenas to non-parties to
compel prehearing discovery, because there is no occasion to do so . . . . [T]he subpoenas in
question did not compel prehearing . . . document discovery . . . .”); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 187–88 (2d Cir. 1999) (declining to reach the issue due to the
court’s determination that 28 U.S.C. § 1782, implicating “broader evidence-gathering
mechanisms” in public arbitrations, was inapplicable in a private setting, thus eliminating the
need to reconcile a conflict between the statutes). The Life Receivables decision also
abrogated two decisions by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
See Atmel Corp. v. LM Ericsson Telefon, AB, 371 F. Supp. 2d 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(differentiating between prehearing appearances and prehearing document production,
noting that the “power to compel production of documents at a hearing implies the lesser
power to require the documents to be produced in advance of the hearing”); Integrity Ins. Co
v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Common sense
encourages the production of documents prior to the hearing so that the parties can
familiarize themselves with the content . . . .”).
180. Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 216 & n.9.
181. Id. at 217. This is in direct contradiction to the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in In re
Security Life Insurance Co. of America. See supra Part II.B.2.
182. See Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 405. In 2002, three years after Hoffrichter left Hay for
PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. (PwC), PwC sold Hoffrichter’s division to E.B.S.
Acquisition Corp. (E.B.S.). Id.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 405–06.
187. Id. at 406.
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45 applied, precluding them from having to respond to the subpoena due to
improper service.188 Instead, the court held that it had the power to enforce
the subpoenas regardless of the documents’ location.189 PwC and E.B.S.
appealed to the Third Circuit.190
The Third Circuit held that non-parties may not be subpoenaed to
produce documents in advance of an arbitration hearing because the text of
the FAA “strictly limited” an arbitrator’s authority “over parties that are not
contractually bound by the arbitration agreement.”191 In so doing, the court
adopted the rationale that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York used in Integrity Insurance Co. v. American Centennial
Insurance Co.192 There, the Southern District of New York determined
that, if parties themselves are unable to bind non-parties, then the arbitral
panel should be similarly restricted.193 However, to promote an efficient
resolution, that court ultimately granted review of the third party documents
prior to the hearing.194
The Third Circuit further explained the rationale behind its textual
approach, noting that Supreme Court statutory interpretation jurisprudence
favored such analysis over considerations of legislative intent “‘when a
statute’s text is clear and does not lead to an absurd result.’”195 The Third
Circuit also based its analysis on the premise that “a court’s policy
preferences cannot override the clear meaning of a statute’s text.”196 First,
focusing on an excerpt of § 7, which states that “[t]he arbitrators . . . may
summon . . . any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness
and in the proper case to bring with him or them any . . . document . . . which
may be deemed material as evidence,”197 the Third Circuit concluded that
an arbitrator’s power “clearly applies only to situations in which the nonparty accompanies the items to the arbitration proceeding, not to situations
in which the items are simply sent.”198 The court construed the use of the
connective word “and” to suggest that documents could only be compelled
188. Id.
189. Id. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected PwC’s
argument because, among other reasons, the rule applied only to a subpoena that is
“‘separate from a subpoena commanding the attendance of a person’” which the court
decided the FAA did not authorize. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 412 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
45(a)(2)).
190. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 406. The Third Circuit granted PwC’s and E.B.S.’s
emergency motion to stay the district court’s order pending its own decision. Id.
191. Id.
192. 885 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
193. Integrity, 885 F. Supp. at 71; accord Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 406.
194. Integrity, 885 F. Supp. at 73.
195. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 406 (quoting United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous.
Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 395 (3d Cir. 1999)). The Mistick PBT court cited, among
others, Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1981) (“We begin by looking to the
language of the Act. . . . When we find the terms of the statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry
is complete, except ‘in rare and exceptional circumstances.’” (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978))).
196. Id. (citing Eaves v. County of Cape May, 239 F.3d 527, 531–32 (3d Cir. 2001)).
197. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (emphasis added).
198. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 407.
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“when the non-party is summoned ‘to attend before [the arbitrator] as a
witness.’”199 In support, the court presented two adaptations of the
Uniform Arbitration Act to illustrate “how a law can give authority to an
arbitrator to issue prehearing document-production orders on third
parties.”200
Next, the court examined the former version of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45, in effect from 1937 to 1991, which precluded federal courts
from compelling prehearing document production from third parties.201
Committee Notes accompanying the 1991 Amendments explained that the
new version was amended to “spare[] the necessity of a deposition of the
custodian of evidentiary material required to be produced.”202 The Third
Circuit noted that, prior to 1991, a court’s subpoena power did not extend to
compelling a non-party to produce documents without also subpoenaing a
witness to testify.203 Therefore, the court determined, as the pre-1991
version of Rule 45 “was framed in terms quite similar to Section 7 of the
FAA,” courts should refrain from extending more power to arbitrators.204
As to the Eighth Circuit’s recognition of an implicit power, the Third
Circuit stated that, if anything could be implied from the language of the
FAA, it would be that it “withholds” the power to compel prehearing
production.205
Having found the language of the statute straightforward, the court then
considered whether the result was absurd and found two reasons it was
not.206 First, the court determined that the result of its restrictive
interpretation of the FAA was not absurd because it was the same standard
under which federal courts had operated for over fifty years.207 Second, the
court believed its literal interpretation would “actually further[] arbitration’s

199. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 7).
200. Id. at 407 n.1 (excerpting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5708(a) (2003) (“The arbitrators
may compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of . . . documents . . . .”) and 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7309 (2007) (“The arbitrators may issue subpoenas . . . for the attendance
of witnesses and for the production of . . . documents and other evidence.”) to demonstrate
that those statutes “explicitly” grant prehearing subpoena power to arbitrators); see supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
201. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 407–08 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (1990) (repealed 1991)).
202. FED. R. CIV. P. 45, advisory committee’s note; see also David D. Siegel, Federal
Subpoena Practice Under the New Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139
F.R.D. 197, 205–06 (1992) (“Under the new Rule 45, a subpoena . . . seeking the production
of documents . . . from a nonparty may be used independently of the regular testimonial
subpoena; the two are no longer wedded, as they were under the prior version of Rule 45.”).
203. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 409.
204. Id. at 408–09. But see 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 111 (2004) (noting that arbitral
proceedings are less formal than judicial proceedings and that the “Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not apply to arbitration proceedings”).
205. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 408 (“By conferring the power to compel a non-party
witness to bring items to an arbitration proceeding while saying nothing about the power
simply to compel the production of items without summoning the custodian to testify, the
FAA implicitly withholds the latter power.”).
206. Id. at 409 (citing United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. Of Pittsburgh,
186 F.3d 376, 395 (3d Cir. 1999)).
207. Id.; see supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
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goal of ‘resolving disputes in a timely and cost efficient manner’”208
because the requirement that a third party appear before the arbitrators with
the requested documents would force parties to limit discovery and take the
time to consider whether the documents they are requesting “justify the
time, money, and effort” involved.209 Without this requirement, parties
have no reason not to “engage in fishing expeditions that undermine some
of the advantages of the supposedly shorter and cheaper system of
arbitration.”210 The Third Circuit explained that proponents of the
efficiencies gained from allowing the parties to review third party
documents prior to an arbitral hearing went “against Supreme Court
precedent regarding the role of [such] considerations in interpreting the
[FAA]”211 because “the central purpose of the FAA is to give effect to
private agreements” rather than efficient dispute resolution.212
Emphasizing the Supreme Court’s “rigorous enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate,” in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Third Circuit stated
that “Congress’s failure explicitly to consider an inefficient byproduct of
the [FAA] does not render the text ambiguous.”213 Further, the court
recognized the costs and efforts in convening an arbitration panel for
purposes of discovery, but determined that “the costs will be slight in
comparison to amassing and transporting a huge volume of documents.”214
The court also recognized that its result may redistribute the balance of
power towards the third party because the party seeking discovery must
appear at a proceeding to examine the documents.215 However, it
determined that such an “ambiguous efficiency effect” would be
“insufficient to overcome a textual command.”216 Ultimately, the Third
Circuit held that § 7 did not authorize an arbitrator to compel prehearing
document production from a third party, and, had Congress meant to confer
such power, it would have done so explicitly.217
Hay Group addressed the views of other circuits that had reached this
same issue. In the course of the majority opinion, then-Judge Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. reviewed and distinguished the opinions of the Fourth and Eighth

208. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 409 (quoting Painewebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372,
1380 (3d Cir. 1993)).
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999)).
211. Id. at 410.
212. Id. (“The legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage
was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate. We therefore
reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious
resolution of claims.” (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219
(1985))).
213. Id. at 411.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 408–09 (“[I]f it is desirable for arbitrators to possess that power, the way to
give it to them is by amending Section 7 of the FAA, just as Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was amended in 1991 to confer such a power on district courts.”); supra
note 200–05 and accompanying text.
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Circuits.218 The court accepted the Fourth Circuit’s proposition that “[a]
hallmark of arbitration—and a necessary precursor to its efficient
operation—is a limited discovery process.”219 However, the Third Circuit
diverged from the Fourth’s Circuit “special need” exception, finding “no
textual basis” for a court to confer such power.220 The court also deviated
from the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Security Life, finding the policy
argument, though potentially desirable, nevertheless incongruous with the
statutory text.221 In his concurring opinion, Judge Michael Chertoff sought
to reconcile the Fourth Circuit’s “special need” exception with the Third’s
Circuit narrow textual analysis.222 He explained that the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of § 7 permitted a “single arbitrator” to compel a “third-party
witness to appear with documents” before him, effectively allowing the
parties to review the documents in advance of the formal hearing because
“the inconvenience of making such a personal appearance may well prompt
the witness to deliver the documents and waive presence.”223 Though this
formality might be inconvenient, Judge Chertoff anticipated that it might
“induce the arbitrators and parties to weigh whether advance production is
really needed,” thus limiting such production to instances of true
necessity.224
2. Second Circuit
On behalf of Life Receivables Trust (Life Receivables), Peachtree Life
Settlements (Peachtree) purchased two life insurance policies of a thirdparty insured to be underwritten by a five million dollar contingent cost
insurance (CCI)225 policy from Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London
(Syndicate 102).226 Peachtree’s business consisted of offering cash
payments to elderly individuals in exchange for their life insurance policies,
profiting from the difference in the event that the individual passed away
before his or her policy expired.227 To “hedge against the possibility that
the insured might live [two or more years] past his or her projected life
expectancy,” Peachtree purchased CCI policies, receiving a pre-determined

218. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 409–10.
219. See Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 409 (quoting COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190
F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999)); see supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
220. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 410; see supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
221. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 408–10; see supra notes 127–35 and accompanying text.
222. See Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 413–14 (Chertoff, J., concurring); supra Part II.B.
223. Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 413–14 (citing David M. Heilbron, The Arbitration Clause
the Preliminary Conference and the Big Case, 45 ARB. J. 38, 43–44 (1990)).
224. Id. at 414.
225. Contingent cost insurance (CCI) “mitigates the risk in purchasing the life insurance
policies of still-living individuals.” Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of
London, 549 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2008).
226. See id. at 212–13.
227. See id. at 212 (noting that Peachtree Life Settlements (Peachtree) becomes the owner
of the insurance policy, paying premiums until the insured dies).
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“net death benefit . . . upon the insured’s demise.”228 These policies
contained mandatory arbitration clauses.229
When the elderly individual in this case outlived his life insurance policy
by more than two years, Life Receivables sought payment of the net death
benefit on his CCI policy.230 Syndicate 102 refused, claiming that Life
Receivables’ calculations regarding the insured’s life expectancy were
fraudulent.231 Life Receivables initiated an arbitration proceeding.232 In
response, Syndicate 102 requested document production from both Life
Receivables and Peachtree and sought to join Peachtree in the arbitration.233
Life Receivables produced documents “to the extent that they were directed
at Peachtree in its role as ‘servicer,’ but not in its role as ‘provider of life
settlements or as originator’ of the CCI policy;” Peachtree refused both
requests.234 Peachtree explained its position that it was “not a party to the
arbitration . . . and that the arbitration panel . . . has no power or jurisdiction
over [Peachtree]. Consequently, [Peachtree] [was] not bound by the
arbitration panel’s rulings and orders, and [would] not consider them.” 235
After unsuccessfully ordering Life Receivables to obtain the remainder of
the documents from Peachtree, the arbitral panel issued a subpoena to
Peachtree directly.236 Peachtree then moved the Southern District of New
York to quash the arbitrators’ subpoena.237 The court enforced the
subpoena, citing as support Peachtree’s status as “a party to the
[underlying] arbitration agreement,” if not to the “specific arbitration at
issue.”238 After complying with the district court’s order, Peachtree
appealed to the Second Circuit, again arguing that arbitrators do not have
the authority to compel prehearing document production from a third
party.239
After summarizing the holdings of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits,
the Second Circuit ultimately adopted the Third Circuit’s approach because,
“[w]hen placed in historical context, [FAA] section 7’s narrow subpoena
power makes sense” due to its resemblance to the pre-1991 version of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.240 The court noted that a “growing

228. Id.
229. Id. at 213.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 213–14.
236. Id. at 214.
237. Id. at 212, 214.
238. Id. at 214. This rationale is similar to that used by the Eighth Circuit in In re Sec.
Life Ins. Co. See supra Part II.A.2.
239. Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 214 & n.5.
240. See id. at 215–16 (“The fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were since
enacted and subsequently broadened demonstrates that if Congress wants to expand arbitral
subpoena authority, it is fully capable of doing so.”). This is the same sentiment offered by
the Third Circuit in Hay Group. See supra Part II.C.1.
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consensus” of district court decisions had followed Hay Group.241 The
Second Circuit explained that courts “must interpret a statute as it is, not as
it might be.”242 In so doing, the court rejected Syndicate 102’s argument
that Peachtree was “intimately related” to Life Receivables and the
arbitration because Life Receivables was merely a “special purpose vehicle
lacking any permanent employees of its own.”243 Rather, the court found
“no discovery exception for closely related entities.”244 In passing, the
court addressed efficiency concerns, noting that “[s]ection 7’s presence
requirement . . . forces the party seeking non-party discovery—and the
arbitrators authorizing it—to consider whether production is truly
necessary.”245
III. COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET § 7 TO AFFORD ARBITRATORS GREAT
DISCRETION IN DISCOVERY
Part I summarized the history, governance, and process of arbitration.
Part II outlined the split among the federal circuit courts over whether FAA
§ 7 authorizes arbitrators to compel prehearing document production from a
third party.
Part III asserts that the broad policy approach, adopted by the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits, better promotes arbitration as a functional alternative to
traditional courtroom adjudication than does the strict textual approach used
by the Second and Third Circuits. As such, Part III argues that the FAA,
correctly interpreted, permits arbitrators to compel prehearing document
production from third parties.
Part III.A explains how the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits’
interpretations, emphasizing speculative privacy rights, fail to protect the
parties’ actual interest in the full and fair extra-judicial resolution of their
disputes. In so doing, Part III.A argues that, to give meaning to the federal
policy favoring arbitration, it must garner consideration at least equal to that
241. Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 216 (citing Matria Healthcare, LLC v. Duthie, 584 F.
Supp. 2d 1078, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“The fact that Congress has not changed the language
of § 7 in eighty years is compelling evidence that the original limitations inherent in § 7 were
intended to remain undisturbed.”); Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., No. 3:05cv1652, 2006 WL
2772695, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2006) (refusing a party the “full range of discovery
afforded in federal court”); Odfjell ASA v. Celanese AG, 328 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding it “particularly inappropriate to subject parties who never agreed to
participate in the arbitration in any way to the notorious burdens of pre-hearing discovery”)).
242. Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 216 (“‘[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.’” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992))).
243. Id. at 217.
244. Id. The court did recognize Peachtree’s “close relationship” with Life Receivables
such that it might have been joined in the arbitration proceeding but noted that it could not
second-guess the panel’s refusal to join Peachtree as a party. Id. at 217 n.10.
245. Id. at 218 (citing Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 414 (3d
Cir. 2004) (Chertoff, J., concurring)); supra note 217 and accompanying text. This was so
even though an arbitral panel could compel a witness’s appearance with documents before a
single arbitrator who would then adjourn the proceeding, thus gaining access to the
documents prior to the formal hearing, although in an admittedly roundabout manner. See
Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 218.
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given to the text of the FAA. Part III.B maintains that any interest a third
party may have merits little concern in the procedural rules governing
arbitration. Part III.B also considers the efficiency interests implicated by a
party’s choice to arbitrate its disputes in order to illustrate that efficient
dispute resolution is more readily promoted if arbitrators are permitted to
compel prehearing document production from third parties.
A. The Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Supports a Full Discovery
Process
Legal analysis does not arise in a vacuum. Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding arbitration has consistently considered two interpretations of
Congress’s goal in enacting the FAA: promotion of (1) contractual
freedom, and (2) the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”246
Distinct from the analyses conducted by the federal courts of appeal, the
Supreme Court has not found these twin functions mutually exclusive.247
In each of the circuit court cases analyzed above, the courts were compelled
to choose one goal over the other.248 For example, the Eighth Circuit
emphasized the necessity of efficient arbitral operations, making no
mention of the language of the parties’ contract to arbitrate.249 Likewise,
the Third Circuit considered efficiency interests, but only to explain how
they were not controlling in the court’s decision.250
The Second and Third Circuits’ limitation on arbitrators’ subpoena
powers is inconsistent with legislative intent for two reasons. First, as
opposed to the Second and Third Circuits’ view, blindly following the plain
language of § 7 does lead to an absurd result; the practical effect of such an
interpretation results in a significant disadvantage to parties seeking third
party document discovery for the mere fact that they have agreed to
arbitrate their disputes. The efficiencies to be gained by arbitration do not
arise solely from a relaxed set of discovery rules, but rather from a plethora
of sources. Even allowing an arbitrator to compel prehearing document
production from a third party, arbitration remains a cheap, efficient
alternative to courtroom litigation and helps prevent court dockets from
becoming even more congested than they already are. Additionally, as
discussed above, some parties are forced to enter contracts with mandatory
arbitration agreements—for example, most security brokerage firms require
that disputes be resolved in an arbitral forum. These parties have not
actively relinquished their rights in hopes to gain efficiency; such forfeiture
is merely a byproduct of the party’s decision to invest in securities.

246. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); see supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
247. In its FAA jurisprudence, the Court generally follows a predictable pattern of first
noting that the purpose of the FAA was to reinforce the validity of private agreements to
arbitrate disputes and then noting the federal policy favoring such agreements. See supra
notes 50–53 and accompanying text. But see infra note 257 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part II.
249. See supra Part II.A.2.
250. See supra Part II.C.1.
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The existence of a federal policy favoring arbitration necessarily includes
the promotion of its use.251 Arbitration has many advantages over
litigation, not the least of which is the increased efficiency of its
operation.252 However, parties are less likely to choose to arbitrate their
disputes if they anticipate an inadequate resolution, regardless of the time or
cost savings.253 Given that the documents requested from third parties are
often at the crux of the dispute,254 it is in the public interest to promote as
full a discovery process in arbitration as is necessary for the arbitral panel to
award a fully informed remedy.255 Further, arbitrators’ determinations as to
the relevance of these documents should garner deference from any
reviewing judge.256
This does not, as the Third Circuit has suggested, take away from the
parties’ freedom to negotiate their own arbitration contract.257 The FAA is
only meant to act as a gap-filler, providing default rules for arbitration
proceedings in the event the parties failed to contract to do so
themselves.258 The parties remain free to negotiate over issues such as third
party discovery if they so wish—it is only in the absence of such
negotiations that § 7 arises.
B. Section 7 Does Not Consider Third Party Interests and Neither Should
Courts
The interpretation of § 7 most consistent with congressional intent
authorizes an arbitrator to compel prehearing document production from
third parties because third parties do not have privacy or fiscal interests that
trump those of the parties themselves. The mere fact of choosing to
arbitrate disputes should not create a windfall of lesser discovery burdens to
outsiders.259 As discussed in Part III.A, the prospect of promoting
251. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 24, 36–38 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 6–21 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d
210, 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (refusing to compel production of documents intricately related to
parties’ complex insurance agreements); Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360
F.3d 404, 405 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing to compel production of documents crucial to parties’
disputed non-solicitation clause). Likely, the majority of potential third parties will be
linked to the underlying dispute, given that parties to arbitration are presumably uninterested
in expensive and protracted discovery from unrelated parties. See supra notes 24, 36–38 and
accompanying text. This connection creates an inference of relevance in these documents
and thus demands respect.
255. See COOLEY, THE ARBITRATOR’S HANDBOOK, supra note 59, § 1.3.4 (noting that the
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes—Revised 2004 requires that
arbitrators consider evidence from each party).
256. See supra notes 62, 175 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part II.C.1. In Hay Group, the Third Circuit noted that Supreme Court
precedent held the “central purpose of the FAA is to give effect to private agreements.” Hay
Group, 360 F.3d at 410 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219
(1985)).
258. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (stating that the FAA is meant “simply to make
the contracting party live up to his agreement”).
259. In In re Sec. Life Ins. Co., the Eighth Circuit noted that it would only have
jurisdiction to decide the case if there were still some partial relief to be considered, given
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arbitration as an alternative to litigation must remain at the forefront of any
FAA analysis.260 Courts’ concerns regarding the burdens potentially placed
on third parties normally focus on the perceived inefficiency that a full
discovery process would impose on arbitration as a whole.261 However,
excessive concern over third party interests may cause even greater
Parties may spend
inefficiency, particularly on the front end.262
inordinately large amounts of time speculating as to which documents may
be relevant to some future dispute in order to avoid the hassle of waiting to
review such documents at a formal hearing. Interpreting § 7 to authorize an
arbitrator to compel prehearing third party document production instead
allows the parties to focus on conducting their businesses. Concerns over
discovery will only materialize in the event of an actual dispute.
An efficiency calculus weighs in favor of providing arbitrators with fuller
discovery authority for other reasons. Courts agree that § 7 authorizes an
arbitrator to compel a third party to produce documents at a hearing.263 The
main result of drawing a line between prehearing production and production
at the hearing, however, is simply to delay document transfer. In the House
report accompanying the FAA’s enactment, the enacting legislators stated
that the FAA was meant to provide a “very simple” procedure for
enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal courts, noting that it was
meant to “follow[] the lines of ordinary motion procedure, reducing
technicality . . . to a minimum and at the same time safeguarding the rights
of the parties.”264 The expediency in allowing arbitrators fuller prehearing
discovery authority reveals itself in time and cost savings to the parties and
arbitrators, as well as to any relevant third parties.
Parties to arbitration will benefit if arbitral subpoena authority is
expanded because they—and their attorneys—will have extra time to
review documents relevant to their argument. This will similarly save the
arbitrators’ time in two ways. First, simply authorizing arbitrators to
compel prehearing document production from third parties avoids the
needless formality that Judge Chertoff envisioned, in which arbitrators
could call a hearing, requiring a third party to present documents requested
that Transamerica had already complied with the court-ordered document production. See
supra note 126 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit identified such potential relief as
copies to be returned, taking into account Transamerica’s property and privacy interests. See
supra note 126 and accompanying text. In consideration of Transamerica’s real interest,
however, returned copies of the documents it provided to the arbitrators seems to be a rather
useless remedy, as it neither protects Transamerica’s privacy—the parties will have reviewed
the documents—nor restores Transamerica to the position it once had. This implies that
Transamerica’s interests are not as important as the court suggests. Therefore, there is no
need to protect this third party interest to the detriment of the parties in dispute.
260. See supra Part III.A
261. See supra Part II.B–C.
262. See COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY, supra note 24, § 3.6 (“[W]ithout discovery,
there is a high risk that surprise evidence will be offered for introduction at the hearing and
that the hearing will be interrupted to permit counsel to argue the admissibility of such
evidence. . . . These interruptions and delays . . . may take up more time than limited
prehearing discovery.”).
263. See supra notes 102, 158, 198, 245 and accompanying text.
264. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
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by one of the parties, and then adjourn the hearing to allow time for
review.265 Second, arbitrators will benefit from more streamlined hearings,
the parties having had ample time to review new information. Just as the
parties and the arbitrators are relieved of attending a faux hearing to obtain
documents, third parties will no longer be forced through the lengthy
process of locating the physical documents and transporting them (along
with themselves) to the site of the arbitral hearing.266 Rather, a broader
interpretation of § 7 allows third parties to sidestep this disturbance and
send copies of the requested documents ahead of the hearing date.
A broad interpretation of § 7 would also result in significant cost savings
for parties, arbitrators, and any related third parties. The parties may save
costs as discussed above, through lesser uncertainty in the initial arbitration
clause negotiation process.267 Eliminating the fictional legal distinction
between compelling third party document production before the hearing and
at the hearing will lead to cost savings for arbitrators because they will be
saved the effort involved in appearing at unnecessary hearings. Third
parties will likely save in transportation costs and the cost of the time they
would have spent appearing at a needless hearing.
CONCLUSION
This Note discusses the interpretive split among the federal circuit courts
of appeals over § 7 of the FAA. After analyzing the approaches taken by
each court, this Note concludes that the stated federal policy favoring
arbitration requires courts to take steps necessary to ensure its utilization as
a functional alternative to courtroom adjudication. The approach advocated
by this Note would allow parties, arbitrators, and also potential third parties
to properly realize the efficiencies that the arbitration process offers.
Therefore, arbitrators should be granted fuller discovery authority.

265. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part III.A. If a clearer standard existed, parties to arbitration could
anticipate as much and try to determine the relevance of certain documents in the custody of
third parties when initially negotiating their arbitration agreements. Understandably, this
would most likely only arise in commercial settings; however, the commercial setting is also
where most of the time and cost savings can be realized.

